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PATENT LAW AND THE DUTY OF
CANDOR: RETHINKING THE
LIMITS OF DISCLOSURE
JAY ERSTLINGt
I. INTRODUCTION
United States patent law requires all patent applicants, their at-
torneys or agents, and everyone else "substantively involved in the
preparation or prosecution of the application"' to abide by a duty of
candor. That duty, which is embodied in United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") Rule 1.562 ("Rule 56"), imposes on "[elach
individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent appli-
cation .. . a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that
individual to be material to patentability. . . ."3 Central to Rule 56 is
the obligation to disclose all known prior art, including published pat-
ent applications and patents, technical journals, and uses of the inven-
tion,4 relevant to determining whether the invention in question is
worthy of a patent. Failure to comply with the obligation can have
draconian consequences: under the doctrine of inequitable conduct, a
breach of the duty of candor during the prosecution of a patent appli-
t Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota. Of
Counsel, Patterson Thuente Christensen Pedersen, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota. The
author would like to thank William Mitchell student research assistant, Ryan Sharp,
and William Mitchell reference librarian, Neal Axton, for their invaluable research
assistance.
1. 37 C.F.R § 1.56(c)(3) (2010). See Avid Identification Sys. Inc. v. The Crystal
Imp. Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (the Federal Circuit recently held that
the founder and president of the plaintiff company was bound by the duty of candor
since he was "substantively involved in all aspects of the company's operation," despite
the fact that he was neither a named inventor nor an attorney or agent), petition for
rehearing denied, 614 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
2. 37 C.F.R § 1.56.
3. 37 C.F.R.§ 1.56(a).
4. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
ExAMINING PROCEDURE § 2001.04 (8th ed. Rev. 2, May 2004) [hereinafter MPEP], de-
scribes the information required to be disclosed as follows: "In addition to prior art such
as patents and publications, 37 CFR 1.56 includes, for example, information on possible
prior public uses, sales, offers to sell, derived knowledge, prior invention by another,
inventorship conflicts, and the like." In addition, the MPEP includes as material infor-
mation "prior art cited in related foreign applications" (MPEP § 2001.06(a)), "informa-
tion relating to or from copending U.S. patent applications" (MPEP § 2001.06(b)),
"information from related litigation" (MPEP § 2001.06(c)), and 'information relating to
claims copied from a patent" (MPEP § 2001.06(d)). It is important to note that although
the MPEP does not have the force of law, it is often treated as having legal authority.
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cation can cause any ensuing patent5 to be declared unenforceable for
the remainder of its patent term. 6
The duty of candor, first established by the PTO in 1977,7 is based
on the notion that patent applicants and their attorneys should "help
the PTO in its job of examining applications thoroughly and allowing
only valid claims."8 Rule 56(a) recites the public policy underpinning
the duty:
A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest.
The public interest is best served, and the most effective pat-
ent examination occurs when, at the time an application is
being examined, the Office is aware of and evaluates the
teachings of all information material to patentability.9
While the public policy interest supporting the duty of candor appears
beyond reproach, the effectiveness of an open-ended obligation to dis-
close all known prior art has recently been called into question.' 0
The doctrine of inequitable conduct, a judicial construct first rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court in 1945,11 has also been the subject of
5. In some cases where there is a pattern of inequitable conduct, the doctrine can
transfer to related patents, causing them also to be declared unenforceable. See Consoli-
dated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 812 (Fed. Cir. 1990). It should
also be noted that a finding of inequitable conduct relating only to a single claim in a
patent can result in the entire patent being declared unenforceable. See Star Sci., Inc. v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
6. See, e.g., JANICE MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAw 431-32 (3d ed.
2009).
7. Patent Examining and Appeal Procedure, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588-95 (Jan. 28, 1977)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (specific commentary on the duty of disclosure is at 42
Fed. Reg. 5589, and the text of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 is at 42 Fed. Reg. 5593).
8. Paul M. Janicke, Do We Really Need So Many Mental and Emotional States in
United States Patent Law?, 8 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 279, 292 (2000).
9. 37 C.F.R § 1.56(a). See also Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint.
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) ("A patent by its very nature is affected with a
public interest. As recognized by the Constitution, it is a special privilege designed to
serve the public purpose of promoting the 'Progress of Science and the useful Arts.' At
the same time, a patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to
the right to access to a free and open market. The far-reaching social and economic
consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that
patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable con-
duct and that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.").
10. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Do Appli-
cant Patent Citations Matter? Implications for the Presumption of Validity (Stanford
Law and Economics Olin, Working Paper No. 401, 2010), available at http1/ssrn.com/
abstract=1656568; Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Limiting the Inequitable Conduct De-
fense, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH 7 (2008); Gina M. Bicknell, Note, To Disclose or Not to Dis-
close: Duty of Candor Obligations of the United States and Foreign Patent Offices, 83
CH.-KENT L. REv. 425, 458-63 (2008).
11. See Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent
Litigation, 7 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 37, 37 (1993) (citing Precision Instrument Mfg. Co.,
324 U.S. 806).
[Vol. 44330
20111 PATENT LAW AND THE DUTY OF CANDOR
much criticism.12 Generally pled as a defense in actions for patent
infringement, the doctrine has been accused of being "irresistible for
litigants-if proven, it allows an infringer to escape any liability for
infringing a valid patent."' 3 In addition to being "overplayed"14 by
defendants, courts have come under attack for expanding the doctrine
beyond its intended boundaries, so much so that the doctrine itself has
been labeled "inequitable"15 for being applied "where the patentee
only committed minor missteps or acted with minimal culpability or in
good faith."' 6 Characterized also as an "absolute plague,"' 7 there has
been much call for the doctrine's reform.' 8
While other countries have adopted some form of disclosure re-
quirement, the United States is unique in requiring such breadth of
candor and in linking failures to disclose with the threat of inequitable
conduct' 9 and the sanction of unenforceability. Given that patent of-
fices worldwide have proven capable of carrying out quality patent ex-
amination without the heavy burden of Rule 56 and the dramatic
consequences of a finding of inequitable conduct, the question natu-
rally arises as to whether either the duty of candor or the doctrine of
inequitable conduct, or both, are necessary in today's patent world.
This Article takes the position that they are not. While most legal
commentators have focused attention on the need to reign in inequita-
ble conduct,20 this Article will concentrate primarily on the duty of
12. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. MERRILL, RICHARD C. LEVIN & MARK B. MYERS, A PATENT
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 121-23 (Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in
the Knowledge-Based Economy, National Research Council eds., 2004) ("In view of its
cost and limited deterrent value the committee recommends the elimination of the ineq-
uitable conduct doctrine or changes in its implementation.").
13. S. REP. No. 110-259, at 62 (2008).
14. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
15. Star Sci., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
16. Star Sci. Inc., 537 F.3d at 1366.
17. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
18. See Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Qual-
ity: Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147 (2006); Christian E. Mam-
men, Controlling the "Plague": Reforming the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329 (2009); Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 593
F.3d 1289, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
19. In this context, inequitable conduct must be distinguished from the doctrine of
fraud on the patent office or the fraudulent procurement of a patent, which consists in
general of affirmative and intentional misrepresentations or deceitful omissions of ma-
terial information that directly impact the decision to grant or reject a patent applica-
tion. Virtually all patent offices sanction such affirmative misconduct.
20. See, e.g., Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v. AluminArt Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317,
1342-44 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Linn, J., concurring); Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Limiting
the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH 7 (2008); Nicole M. Murphy, Note,
Inequitable-Conduct Doctrine Reform: Is the Death Penalty for Patents Still Appropri-
ate?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2274 (2009).
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candor and will argue that, given the nature of contemporary patent
examination, the obligation to disclose all known prior art should be
significantly limited, if not eliminated entirely.
Part II of this Article will attempt to place the duty of candor and
the doctrine of inequitable conduct within the context of patent exami-
nation. It will also glance at some of the cases that highlight the
troubled nature of the doctrine. Part III will look comparatively at
disclosure requirements, or the lack thereof, in other national and re-
gional jurisdictions to try to sample the extent to which disclosure con-
tributes to quality patent examination. Part III will focus in
particular on the European Patent Office, which has no disclosure re-
quirement; Japan, which requires disclosure but does not sanction
non-compliance; Australia, a country that adopted and then aban-
doned a duty to disclose; and Israel, a country whose patent law man-
dates a duty of disclosure that most closely approximates that of the
United States. Part IV will explore the impact of technology, law, and
international cooperation on patent examination in an effort to deter-
mine whether the changing nature of the examination process alters
or obviates the need for continued disclosure. And finally, Part V will
conclude with a recommendation for curtailing the duty of candor.
II. PATENT EXAMINATION AND THE DUTY OF CANDOR
A. PATENT ExAMINATION BAsIcs
The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), like vir-
tually all patent offices worldwide, grants patents to inventionS21 that
are novel, 22 nonobvious,23 and useful.24  An applicant-or, as is
mostly the case, a patent attorney or agent acting on an applicant's
behalf25-applies for a patent by filing with the PTO an application
that contains a description of the invention "in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which
[the invention] pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
21. An invention is defined in the Patent Act (Title 35 of the United States Code) as
"any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Foreign patent laws employ different formulas for
determining novelty, but all patent laws require it as a basic condition for patentability.
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). The patent laws of most countries use the term
"inventive step" to describe the requirement that an invention must not have been obvi-
ous to an ordinary person skilled in the art in order to merit the grant of a patent.
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). The patent laws of many countries use the term
"industrially applicable" to describe the utility requirement.
25. For the sake of simplicity, this article will generally refer only to applicants,
although it should be remembered that patent attorneys or agents do the majority of
filing and prosecution of patent applications.
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make and use the same."2 6 At the end of the description, the appli-
cant includes one or more claims that distinctly define "the subject
matter which the applicant regards as [her or] his invention."27 When
a patent is granted, it is the claims that define the scope of the patent
owner's right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to
sell, or importing the invention. 28
The job of the PTO and of a patent examiner within the office is to
examine each claim in an application to determine whether the claim
meets the requirements of patentability set forth in the Patent Act 2 9
and to verify that it is adequately described in and supported by the
description.30 The principal tool that an examiner uses to carry out
this task is the body of relevant prior art against wlhich the examiner
compares each claim. In accordance with § 102(a) and (b) of the Pat-
ent Act,3 ' that body consists of the following: any publication, includ-
ing published United States or foreign patents or patent applications,
technical or scientific journal articles, or general publications that
were available either before the date of the invention or more than one
year before the patent application filing date; knowledge or use of the
invention in the United States by third parties before the date of the
invention; and public use of the invention, or placing the invention on
sale in the United States more than one year before the filing date. 32
At its most basic,33 examination takes the following form: every
application filed with the PTO is assigned to an examiner who has
specialized knowledge in the technical field embodied in the invention
under examination. The examiner formulates a search strategy that
corresponds to the claims in question and, on the basis of an exhaus-
tive network of prior art documentation databases, the examiner com-
pares the claims to the prior art. In the event the examiner uncovers
patent-defeating prior art applicable to any one or more of the claims,
the examiner communicates that fact to the applicant,34 together with
26. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). A patent application is generally divided into the fol-
lowing parts: a description of the background of the invention, a brief summary of the
invention, a detailed description of the invention, a description of the best mode of oper-
ation of the invention, drawings and a brief description thereof, and claims. See MPEP
§ 608.01 (8th ed. Rev. 2, May 2004).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
28. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
29. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006).
30. See MUELLER, supra note 6, at 45.
31. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b).
32. Id.
33. For a more detailed description of the examination process, see MUELLER, supra
note 6, at 42-63; see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law's Inequitable
Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 729-32 (2009).
34. The communication is contained in a PTO document called an "office action."
While most offices issue such documents, they may give them different names. In the
European Patent Office, for example, the initial document is called an "Extended Euro-
333
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
the relevant reasons, and gives the applicant an opportunity either to
demonstrate why the prior art references are not patent defeating or
to narrow or limit the claims in the application in order to overcome
the negative effect of the references. This process continues until the
examiner allows all or some of the claims, the examiner rejects the
application, or the applicant abandons the unpatentable claims or the
entire application.35 Similar examination procedures occur through-
out the world in patent offices that engage in substantive patent
examination.
B. THE ROLE OF THE Dury OF CANDOR
What, then, is the role of the duty of candor in the examination
process? Despite the access that examiners have to the world's body of
documentary prior art, applicants in most countries are generally ex-
pected to call to patent examiners' attention important prior art of
which they have knowledge.36 Applicants typically comply by includ-
ing an overview or summary of the state of the art in the part of the
description that explains the background of the invention.37 United
States practice calls for more, however. In addition to providing back-
ground on related prior art, applicants before the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office ("PTO") file information disclosure
statements ("IDS"),3 8 which are detailed forms that contain biblio-
pean Search Report," and subsequent documents are referred to simply as "communica-
tions." Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, Part C §§ 3.5-3.7
(April 2010), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/guidelines.html.
35. Cotropia, supra note 33, at 729-32. In 2009, the PTO received 482,871 patent
applications. On the other hand, the office only granted 191,927 patents. U.S. Patent
Statistics Chart, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (April 20, 2010), http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.htm.
36. In some countries, including Canada, Mexico, Israel, and India, applicants are
also asked to supply the examiner with a list of the other countries in which examina-
tion of the application is taking place as well as-occasionally-copies of the search
reports that those other examiners have issued (see Part III, below). It should be noted
that applicants have an incentive to disclose prior art because the more prior art refer-
ences are considered and rejected by an examiner, the less likely it is that the patent
will be invalidated in later litigation.
37. In the United States, the relevant provision from the MPEP § 608.01(c), pro-
vides as follows: "The background of the invention ordinarily comprises ... : (2) Descrip-
tion of the related art .... A paragraph(s) describing to the extent practical the state of
the prior art or other information disclosed known to the applicant, including references
to specific prior art or other information where appropriate." MPEP § 608.01(c)(2).
Elsewhere, see, e.g., European Patent Convention, Implementing Regulations to the
Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Rule 42(1)(b), 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (1973),
and European Patent Convention, Regulations Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty,
Rule 5.1(a)(ii) (1970).
38. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.97-98 (2010) (containing rules on the filing and content of infor-
mation disclosure statements). See also Form PTOISB/08a (01-10), UNITED STATES
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/file/efs/guidancel
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graphic lists of all the material prior art,39 and they attach and sub-
mit paper copies, oftentimes cartons-full, of the references listed.
Provided that an applicant properly includes in the IDS "all infor-
mation known to be material to patentability," the applicant will be
deemed to have met the duty of candor.40 Failure to be fully inclusive,
however, can lead to allegations and, even worse, to findings, of ineq-
uitable conduct. The problem is that it has become increasingly diffi-
cult, as will be discussed below, for applicants to determine whether
information is material. As a result, applicants feel obliged to over-
disclose prior art, including even the most marginally relevant refer-
ences, in order to guard against the future possibility of having to fend
off accusations of omitting material art.41 Equally fearful that they
will be accused of mischaracterizing the prior art that they do submit
to examiners, applicants also feel constrained to avoid assisting in ex-
amination by indicating the relevance of their submissions. As emi-
nent patent attorney, Robert Armitage,42 somewhat cynically
described it:
Patent applicants anticipating latter allegations of conceal-
ment hold nothing back from patent examiners in the way of
"prior art." Savvy patent applicants unleash a torrent of
"prior art" on patent examiners, leaving them awash in a sea
of earlier-issued patents and printed publications that the
patent examiner is expected to consider before deciding to is-
sue a patent.
These same patent applicants then studiously refrain from pro-
viding any meaningful characterization of the significance or rele-
vance of much of the cascade of information that they provide to
patent examiners. The rules of the game are crudely expressed as,
"Dump it, but don't discuss it."4 3 Thus, rather than furthering quality
updatedIDS.pdf (providing the standard information disclosure statement form that
applicants file).
39. The lists include United States patents and published patent applications, for-
eign patents, and non-patent literature, such as journal articles, books, magazines,
symposia and conference proceedings, and catalogs. 37 C.F.R. § 1.98.
40. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) ("The duty to disclose all information known to be material
to patentability is deemed to be satisfied if all information known to be material to
patentability of any claim issued in a patent was cited by the Office or submitted to the
Office in the manner prescribed by §§ 1.97(b)-(d) and 1.98.").
41. In the alternative, some applicants choose not to undertake any pre-filing pat-
ent searches themselves in order to avoid uncovering prior art that they will have to
submit to the PTO.
42. Robert Armitage is Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Eli Lilly and
Company.
43. Robert A. Armitage, The Legislative Agenda for the 111th Congress: Inequita-
ble Conduct and Post-Grant Review: Why the Imperative to Eliminate the 'Inequitable
Conduct' Defense? What Relates Eliminating the Defense to Expanding Post-Grant Re-
view?, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. AsS'N, 3 (2009), http://www2.aipla.org/html/mw/2009/pa-
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patent examination, complying with the duty of candor may arguably
impede it.
The results of a recent study further call into question whether
the duty of candor is achieving its policy objectives. While examiners
are charged with reviewing and evaluating the references cited in an
IDS, three leading patent scholars, Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark
Lemley, and Bhaven Sampat, have found "that patent examiners ef-
fectively ignore almost all applicant-submitted art, relying almost ex-
clusively on prior art they find themselves."44 After carefully ruling
out a series of logical reasons why examiners might focus on their own
prior art,45 the authors conclude that examiners may simply tend to
be "myopic," 4 6 either because of "cognitive biases" (people are apt "to
think more highly of things they do themselves than things others
provide to them")47 or as a "time-saving decision" ("[elxaminers oper-
ate under significant time constraints, and they may simply not have
time to read and evaluate the art applicants submit").48 Based on the
authors' findings, enforcing the duty of candor seems to make little
sense, and punishing omissions by declaring an otherwise valid patent
unenforceable under the guise of inequitable conduct seems to make
even less.
C. THE PLACE OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
It is therefore ironic that the incidence of accused infringers
pleading inequitable conduct as a defense to patent infringement has
increased.49 According to several studies, inequitable conduct is now
asserted in about one fourth of all patent cases filed,50 regardless of
the merits,5 1 and the number of cases appealed on inequitable conduct
pers/Armitage-paper.pdf (paper presented at 2009 Mid-Winter Institute of the
American Intellectual Property Law Association).
44. Cotropia, Lemley, & Sampat, supra note 10, at 2. It is noteworthy that the
authors' data reject the possibility that "applicants submit uniformly weak prior art" as
a reason for the focus on examiner-found prior art. Id. at 3.
45. For example, that applicants tend to submit foreign-origin prior art and PTO
examiners prefer United States origin prior art, that applicants bury the relevant prior
art in a flood of less relevant art, or that the timing of applicant submissions does not
coincide well with the timing of examination. Id.
46. Id. at 23.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 18, at 155-56; and Mammen, supra note 18, at 1361
("The statistical data is suggestive that the prevalence of inequitable conduct cases is
expanding, especially at the pleading stage.").
50. Cotropia, supra note 33, at 739 (citing To Promote Innovation: The Proper Bal-
ance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, F.T.C., 156 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf).
51. According to Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, parties may "frequently allege inequi-
table conduct where courts find no evidence of it." Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Inequita-
[Vol. 44336
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grounds rose from thirteen to thirty between 2004 and 2007.52 So per-
vasive is this increase that Chief Judge Randall R. Rader of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit characterized
the doctrine as "constantly overflowing its banks,"53 and lamented
that inequitable conduct "grew from a tiny bush on the patent land-
scape that inhibited gross fraud into a ubiquitous weed that infects
every prosecution and litigation involving patents."54
The doctrine of inequitable conduct stems from the equitable doc-
trine of unclean hands; in other words, patentees seeking to enforce
their rights should not benefit from the redress of the courts if they
had dirtied their hands by intentionally misleading the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO").55 The early Supreme Court
cases that gave birth to inequitable conduct bore no relation to cases
involving the omission of material prior art.56 In the early cases,
"egregious fraud, perjury, and extortion infected every part of the pat-
ent acquisition and enforcement process."57 But for the deceitful or
abusive behavior, the patentee in those cases would not have been
able to receive a patent, let alone enforce it. The seminal 1945 case of
Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance
Machinery Co.,58 for example, involved perjury and fraud in an inter-
ference proceeding.59 During the proceeding's discovery phase, the
patentee learned that the opponent had lied by submitting false affi-
davits about the dates of conception and disclosure of the invention as
well as about inventorship. Rather than reporting the fraud, the pat-
entee settled the interference and received rights to both the patents
ble Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: Combating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
147, 161 (2005). See also MERRILL ET AL., supra note 12, at 121-23 (reporting the percep-
tion that "defense is asserted too freely.").
52. Randall R. Rader, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Foreword: Always at the Margin: Inequitable Conduct in
Flux, 59 AM. U. L. REv. 777, 779 (2010) (citing statistics compiled by the Stanford Intel-
lectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse). In 2008, there was a slight decrease to
twenty-six cases appealed. Id.
53. Id. at 780.
54. Id. at 781.
55. See Mammen, supra note 18, at 1333-34.
56. See Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933); Hazel-
Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944); Precision Instrument Mfg.
Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
57. Rader, supra note 52, at 781. See also Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v.
AluminArt Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Linn, J., concurring) ("The
ease with which inequitable conduct can be pled, but not dismissed, is a problem of our
own making. The Supreme Court's three inequitable conduct cases involved overt fraud,
not equivocal acts of omission.").
58. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
59. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2006) (an interference proceeding is an administrative
proceeding within the PTO used to decide priority of invention (i.e., who was the first to
invent) when two applicants submit competing applications for the same invention).
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in question. When the patentee attempted to enforce the patents in a
subsequent infringement action, the district court refused to do so,
and the Supreme Court ultimately agreed, arguing that not only the
doctrine of unclean hands, but also the public interest,60 precluded the
enforcement of "perjury-tainted patents."61
As Judge Rader aptly pointed out, the original rationale for the
doctrine of inequitable conduct thus had nothing to do with the objec-
tive of encouraging applicants to disclose prior art:
[N]otably, the Supreme Court did not make any connection
between its inequitable conduct doctrine and an incentive to
disclose prior art to the patent officer during prosecution. In
other words, this doctrine was not born as a universal princi-
ple to encourage a patent owner to disclose (excessive
amounts of) prior art, but only as a remedy for truly abusive
behavior.62
Modern conceptions of the duty of candor and the doctrine of un-
clean hands have changed this rationale, however, with the result
that the United States is "the only country in the world that embraces
inequitable conduct as an incentive to disclose prior art."63 In Digital
Control Inc. v. Charles Machine Works,64 the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit laid out the elements necessary to prevail in a claim of
inequitable conduct:
A patent may be rendered unenforceable for inequitable con-
duct if an applicant, with intent to mislead or deceive the ex-
aminer, fails to disclose material information or submits
materially false information to the PTO during prosecution.
The party asserting inequitable conduct must prove a thresh-
60. According to Robert J. Goldman, "[t]he Court's discussion of the public interest
relating to patents [was] consistent with the anti-monopoly tenor of the times."
Goldman, supra note 11, at 50. The Court saw patents as "an exception to the general
rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open market." Id. (citing
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)). As a
result, it was necessary that "such monopolies [be] kept within their legitimate scope."
Goldman, supra note 11, at 50. This is certainly not the prevailing view of patents to-
day. For example, the USPTO Vision states: "The incentives and rewards associated
with strong protection of ideas, creativity, and innovation stimulate further innovation
and creativity in the form of new products, services, and technology. Simply put, IP
rights are a stimulus to innovation and are critical to long-term economic growth."
2010-2015 Strategic Plan, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 3 (2010),
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/USPTO.2010-2015_Strategic-Plan.pdf.
61. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 816 ("[Wlhere a suit in equity con-
cerns the public interest as well as the private interests of the litigants this doctrine
assumes even wider and more significant proportions. For if an equity court properly
uses the maxim to withhold its assistance in such a case it not only prevents a wrong-
doer from enjoying the fruits of his transgression but averts an injury to the public.").
62. Rader, supra note 52, at 781 (parenthesis in original).
63. Id.
64. 437 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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old level of materiality and intent by clear and convincing evi-
dence. The court must then determine whether the
questioned conduct amounts to inequitable conduct by bal-
ancing the levels of materiality and intent, "with a greater
showing of one factor allowing a lesser showing of the
other."65
Materiality and intent are therefore both required to make out a case
of inequitable conduct, and both must be proved by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. While a finding of inequitable conduct can be based on
either failure to disclose or submission of false information, the scope
of this Article is limited to disclosure.66
1. Materiality
It has become particularly problematic for applicants to gauge
materiality, as well as for patentees to defend against charges of ineq-
uitable conduct, because the materiality standard applied by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") and that applied
by the courts are not consistent. In 1977, when the PTO first crafted
Rule 56, it provided that information was material to patentability
when there was a "substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner
would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the applica-
tion to issue as a patent."67 In 1992, the PTO amended Rule 56 and
replaced the "reasonable examiner" standard with a narrower "prima
facie" standard;68 the latter version of the rule is still largely in force.
The 1992 rule reflected the PTO's view that the reasonable examiner
standard was "insufficiently objective, unworkable, and too impre-
cise,"69 and that it was probably "leading to unjustifiable charges of
inequitable conduct in litigation."70 The new Rule 56 attempted to
overcome those defects by providing as follows:
65. Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (citations
omitted); see also McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 913
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
66. Since failure to disclose is an act of omission while the submission of false infor-
mation is an act of commission, the author believes that the two deserve separate analy-
sis and separate legal treatment.
67. Patent Examining and Appeal Procedure, 42 Fed. Reg. 5593 (January 28,
1977).
68. Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2024 (January 17, 1992). As to the nar-
rower nature of the new standard, see Digital Control Inc., 437 F.3d at 1314.
69. Mammen, supra note 18, at 1335 (footnotes omitted).
70. Id. at n.22 (citing Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., Evolution and Future ofNew Rule 56
and the Duty of Candor: The Evolution and Issue of New Rule 56, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 136,
139-40 (1992)).
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§ 1.56 Duty to disclose information material to patentability
(b) . . . [Information is material to patentability when it
is not cumulative to information already of record or
being made of record in the application, and
(1) It establishes, by itself of in combination with
other information, a prima facie case of un-
patentability of a claim; or
(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the
applicant takes in:
(i) Opposing an argument of unapatentability
relied on by the Office, or
(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.71
The purpose of the amended rule was thus to provide "a clearer and
more objective definition of what information the [PTO] considers ma-
terial to patentability"72 and, accordingly, to better balance the needs
of applicants and the PTO.73 Comparing the old and new rules, the
reasonable examiner standard is generally considered "more search-
ing and would require a patent applicant to submit a great amount of
information than would otherwise satisfy the current [PTO] definition
of materiality."74
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which
hears appeals in inequitable conduct cases, has principally adhered to
the "reasonable examiner" standard.75 Faced with the adoption of the
new rule, the court initially signaled that it would continue to apply
the old standard, "but only as to cases that were prosecuted under the
earlier version of Rule 56."76 The court confessed that it had "not de-
cided whether it should adhere to the preexisting standard for inequi-
table conduct in prosecutions occurring after the effective date of the
new rule,"7 7 and thus it had not resolved the question "whether the
standard for materiality in inequitable conduct cases is governed by
equitable principles or by the [PTO's] rules."7 8
In Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Machine Works,79 however, the
Federal Circuit indicated that it had made up its mind, at least for the
time being. The court held that "the new Rule 56 was not intended to
71. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2010).
72. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
73. Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2024 (January 17, 1992); see also Mack,
supra note 18, at 154.
74. MUELLER, supra note 6, at 435.
75. Id. at 433.
76. Dayco Prods., Inc., 329 F.3d at 1364.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 437 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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replace or supplant the 'reasonable examiner' standard;"8 0 further-
more, it determined that courts could also invoke three other histori-
cal standards to weigh materiality, at least when the allegation
concerned a misrepresentation. 8 ' As for the reasonable examiner
standard, the court noted that it was "an appropriate starting point
for any discussion of materiality, for it appears to be the broadest,
thus encompassing the others and because that materiality boundary
most closely aligns with how one ought to conduct business with the
PTO."82 Subsequent cases have underscored the supremacy of the
reasonable examiner test,8 3 determining, for example, that informa-
tion may be deemed material even if its disclosure would not have af-
fected the outcome of the patent examination or invalidated the
patent.84
Patentees who satisfy the PTO's definition of materiality may
therefore find themselves having to defend against accusations of in-
equitable conduct on the basis of the Federal Circuit's broader materi-
ality standard. It is no wonder that applicants have erred on the side
of over-disclosure.
2. Intent to Deceive
The intent element of inequitable conduct has posed an additional
hurdle. "Because 'smoking gun' evidence of intent to deceive rarely
exists,"85 circumstantial evidence is almost always relied upon to infer
deceptive intent.8 6 In Larson Manufacturing Company of South Da-
kota, Inc. v. AluminArt Products Limited,87 a decision that reversed in
part and remanded a district court's finding of inequitable conduct,88
80. Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Machine Works, 437 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
81. Digital Control Inc., 437 F.3d at 1315 ("These standards included: the objective
'but for' standard, where the misrepresentation was so material that the patent should
not have issued; the subjective 'but for' test, where the misrepresentation actually
caused the examiner to approve the patent application when he would not otherwise
have done so; and the 'but it may have' standard, where the misrepresentation may
have influenced the parent examiner in the course of prosecution.").
82. Id. (citing Am. Hoist and Derrick Co. v. Sowa and Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1358,
1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
83. See, e.g., Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1326
(Fed. Cir. 2009); Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1297
(Fed. Cir. 2008); Star Sci. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2008); McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 913 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
84. See, e.g., Larson Mfg. Co., 449 F.3d at 1327.
85. MUELLER, supra note 6, at 438.
86. See Star Sci., 537 F.3d at 1366; Larson Mfg. Co., 559 F.3d at 1340.
87. 559 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In the interests of full disclosure, it should be
noted that the author is Of Counsel at the firm that was accused of inequitable conduct
in the Larson case.
88. Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D. v. AluminArt Prods. Ltd., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (D.S.D.
2007).
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit gave "some
guidance to the district court with respect to the issue of deceptive
intent,"89 stating as follows:
[M]ateriality does not presume intent, and nondisclosure, by
itself, cannot satisfy the deceptive intent element. Rather,
the alleged infringer must prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence a specific intent to deceive the PTO. While deceptive
intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, the cir-
cumstantial evidence must still be clear and convincing.
"Further, the inference must not only be based on sufficient
evidence and be reasonable in light of that evidence, but it
must also be the single most reasonable inference able to be
drawn from the evidence to meet the clear and convincing
standard." [Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1367.] Relatedly, just
as merely withholding a reference cannot support an infer-
ence of deceptive intent, so too an accused infringer cannot
carry its threshold burden simply by pointing to the absence
of a credible good faith explanation.90
The Federal Circuit has also held that negligence, or even gross
negligence, is not enough on its own to establish intent.91 At the same
time, the court has repeatedly determined that the higher the materi-
ality of the undisclosed information, the lower the standard of proof
needed to infer intent from the circumstantial evidence. 92 In Honey-
well International, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Systems Corp.,9 for ex-
ample, the court stated that "[tihe more material the information
misrepresented or withheld by the applicant, the less evidence of in-
tent will be required in order to find inequitable conduct."94 As a
result, the intent standard has not been consistently applied by the
courts. Ferring B. V. v. Barr Laboratories95 is a case in point. In Fer-
ring, the Federal Circuit applied a negligence analysis when it de-
clared that it was appropriate to uphold a district court's grant of
89. Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D. v. AluminArt Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
90. Larson Mfg Co. of S.D., 559 F.3d at 1340-41 (all other citations omitted).
91. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (en banc) ("We adopt the view that a finding that particular conduct amounts
to 'gross negligence' does not of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive; the in-
volved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of good
faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive.").
92. See, e.g., Optium Corp. v. Emcore Corp., 603 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(Prost, J., concurring); Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d
982, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120
F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471,
1481-82 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Am. Hoist and Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1363.
93. 488 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
94. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 488 F.3d at 999. See also Am. Hoist and Derrick Co., 725
F.2d at 1363; Critiko, Inc., 120 F.3d at 1256.
95. 437 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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summary judgment "if there has been a failure to supply highly mate-
rial information and if the summary judgment record establishes that
(1) the applicant knew of the information; (2) the applicant knew or
should have known of the materiality of the information; and (3) the
applicant has not provided a credible explanation for the withhold-
ing."96 More recently, in Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc.,97 the Federal
Circuit's reliance on Ferring to uphold a finding of inequitable con-
duct 98 prompted a dissenting judge to say that "the district court in-
correctly conflated intent with materiality."99 He went on to argue
that "[w]hile a smoking gun may not be needed to show an intent to
deceive, more is needed than materiality of a reference."' 00
The inconsistent application of the inequitable conduct doctrine
has created considerable uncertainty among the applicant community
and has created a push for change. That push may have been felt in
the Federal Circuit because on April 26, 2010, the court granted a pe-
tition for a rehearing en banc of its decision in Therasense v. Becton,
Dickinson and Co.10
D. THE THERASENSE CASE
Therasense concerns a patent for a disposable blood glucose test
strip for diabetes. The district court held, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, that the patent was
unenforceable as a result of the applicant's failure to disclose state-
ments made to the European Patent Office ("EPO") during a revoca-
96. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., 437 F.3d 1181, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
97. 543 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
98. Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008). ("Based on its
predicate findings that the RFO art was highly material, that the applicants knew of
the RFO art and at least should have known of its materiality, and that the applicants
had failed to present any good faith explanation for withholding the highly material
RFO art from the PTO, the district court properly inferred that the applicants intended
to deceive the PTO by failing to disclose the RFO art.").
99. Praxair, Inc., 543 F.3d at 1329 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
100. Id. In McKesson Info Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc., Judge Newman, in
dissent, also complained about an insufficient standard for establishing intent: "To
avoid the inequity resulting from litigation-driven distortion of the complex procedures
of patent prosecution, precedent firmly requires that the intent element of inequitable
conduct must be established by clear and convincing evidence of deceptive intent-not
of mistake, if there were such, but of culpable intent." McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc., v.
Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
101. 374 Fed. App'x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Therasense decision that was the basis
for the appeal is at 593 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2010). It should be noted that the push has
also included efforts at reform of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 100 et seq., which so far
have been unsuccessful. The arguably boldest inequitable conduct reform effort to date
came from Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), who on March 14, 2008, introduced a proposal
to amend S. 1145, 110th Congress, to ban pleading inequitable conduct in patent in-
fringement litigation and to replace it with a reissue process. Patent Reform Act of
2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2008).
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tion proceeding of the European patent counterpart to the United
States patent-in-suit. 102 The district court found, and the Federal
Circuit agreed, that statements made to the EPO were highly mate-
rial to the prosecution of the United States patent because they con-
tradicted statements made to the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO").o 3 The Federal Circuit also found that the
district court "did not clearly err"104 in finding intent to deceive be-
cause (1) the statements made to the PTO "were absolutely critical in
overcoming the examiner's earlier rejections of the claims;" (2) "the
EPO statements would have been very important to an examiner;" (3)
the patentee's attorney and research director "knew of the EPO state-
ments and consciously withheld them from the PTO;" (4) neither one
provided a "credible explanation" for their failure to do so; and (5)
their "explanations for withholding the EPO documents were so in-
credible that they suggested intent to deceive."' 05
Federal Circuit Judge Richard Linn filed a dissenting opinion in
which he argued at length and in great detail that materiality and
intent were both lacking in the case.' 06 Contending that the paten-
tee's statements to the EPO could reasonably be interpreted as being
consistent with its statements to the PTO, and therefore they should
be viewed as immaterial in accordance with Rule 56,107 Judge Linn
stated:
Even if this information were material, however, the individ-
uals who owed a duty of disclosure to the PTO produced a
good faith explanation as to why they withheld the EPO sub-
missions. . . . Such an explanation will defeat a charge of in-
equitable conduct if it is "plausible." The question, thus, is
not whether it is plausible that the information is immate-
rial-a question asked under the objective materiality
prong-but rather, whether it is plausible that the individu-
als subjectively believed that the reference was immaterial at
102. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1300 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
103. Therasense, Inc., 593 F.3d at 1301.
104. Id. at 1308.
105. Id. at 1306. The court also noted in dicta that in a "close case, . . . we have
repeatedly emphasized that the duty of disclosure requires that the material in question
be submitted to the examiner rather than withheld by the applicant." Id. at 1305.
106. Id. at 1312 (Linn, J., dissenting).
107. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2) (stating "(b) Under this section, information is material
to patentability when it is not cumulative to information already of record or being
made of record in the application, and . . . (2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a posi-
tion the applicant takes in: (i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by
the Office, or (ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.").
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the time they withheld it-a question presented under the
subjective intent prong.108
In granting the en banc rehearing, the Federal Circuit chose to
confront the material and intent standards head-on. The court there-
fore requested briefs addressing the following six questions:
1. Should the materiality-intent-balancing framework for
inequitable conduct be modified or replaced?
2. If so, how? In particular, should the standard be tied di-
rectly to fraud or unclean hands? If so, what is the appro-
priate standard for fraud or unclean hands?
3. What is the proper standard for materiality? What role
should the United States Patent and Trademark Office's
rules play in defining materiality? Should a finding of
materiality require that but for the alleged misconduct,
one or more claims would not have issued?
4. Under what circumstances is it proper to infer intent
from materiality?
5. Should the balancing inquiry (balancing materiality and
intent) be abandoned?
6. Whether the standards for materiality and intent in
other federal agency contexts or at common law shed
light on the appropriate standards to be applied in the
patent context. 109
As of the time of drafting this manuscript, twenty-five amicus
briefs had been filed11o on behalf of the United States, 11 the Ameri-
can Bar Association, intellectual property law associations, industry
associations, corporations, and private parties. The court set oral ar-
108. Therasense, Inc., 593 F.3d at 1312. Judge Linn issued a concurring opinion in
Larson, in which he wrote, "I respectfully submit that the test for inferring deceptive
intent, as it currently exists, falls short of the standard 'needled] to strictly enforce the
burden of proof and elevated standard of proof in the inequitable conduct context.' The
facts of this case suggest that the time has come for the court to review the issue en
banc." Larsen Mfg. Co., 559 F.3d at 1344 (Linn, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Judge Linn may therefore have set the stage for the rehearing in Therasense.
109. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 374 Fed. App'x 35, 36 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
110. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 593 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir.
2010). To arrive at this number the "Briefs and Other Related Documents" were counted
to determine the number of amicus briefs (if a corrected brief was filed, only the cor-
rected copy was counted).
111. Arguing that the proper standard for materiality should be Rule 56, the proper
standard for intent should be specific intent to deceive, and that intent should not be
inferred from materiality alone, but materiality should be allowed to show intent. Brief
of the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of Neither
Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 593 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(Nos. 2008-1511, 2008-1512, 2008-1513, 2008-1514, 2008-1595), 2010 WL 3390234.
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gument for November 9, 2010.112 It is likely that the Federal Circuit
will attempt to add much needed structure and certainty to the deter-
mination of inequitable conduct, 113 but it is unlikely that the court
will reach beyond the doctrine to examine the duty of candor and the
disclosure requirement. So while it can be hoped that the obligation to
disclose all material information to the PTO will be less fraught with
the threat of attack, it is doubtful that the court will focus on the rele-
vance of the duty of candor in today's world or question why other
countries are able to carry out quality patent examinations without
exacting such a high disclosure toll on their applicants. The remain-
der of this Article will attempt to do just that.
III. DISCLOSURE IN OTHER COUNTRIES
A recent study by the former chief economist of the European Pat-
ent Office ("EPO"), Bruno van Pottelsberghe,11 4 compared the quality
of examination in three leading patent offices, the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), the Japan Patent Office ("JPO"),
and the EPO. The study defined quality "as the extent to which a
patent system complies with its legal standards in a transparent
way,"115 and it employed a new, two-layer methodological framework,
with legal standards making up the first layer and operational design
the second, to carry out the analysis. 116 The study concluded that
examination quality was worst in the United States: "The quality of
the examination process is substantially higher in Europe than in the
US," 250% higher according to the study's metrics, while Japan was in
an intermediate position of 170%.117 Among the reasons cited for the
112. See Upcoming Oral Arguments, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRcurr (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.cafe.uscourts.gov/index.php?option=com
content&view=article&id=176&Itemid=42.
113. In June 2010, the Federal Circuit decided Advanced Magnetic Closures v. Rome
Fastener, 607 F.3d 817 (Fed. Cir. 2010). ChiefJudge Rader filed a concurring opinion in
which he stated: "In Therasense, this court has been asked to address the transforma-
tion of inequitable conduct from the rare exceptional cases of egregious fraud that re-
sults in the grant of a patent that would not otherwise issue to a rather automatic
assertion in every infringement case. The exception has become the rule. Generally, I
would hold inequitable conduct cases until after this court reexamines whether to put
the doctrine back into the exception category."Advanced Magnetic Closures, 607 F.3d at
835 (Rader, J., concurring).
114. Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, The Quality Factor in Patent Systems
(European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics, ECARES Work-
ing Paper No. 2010-027, 2010), available at http://ecares.org/.
115. Id. at 2.
116. Id. at 2-3.
117. Id. at 34.
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poorer quality, according to the study, was the United States' duty of
candor (or "soft identification of prior art," as the study termed it)."x8
According to the study, "the person that is in charge of identifying
the prior art will de facto influence the quality of the search report
(comprehensiveness and relevance) and, therefore, the degree to
which the novelty condition is met.""19 In Europe, that responsibility
lies exclusively with the examiner, which the study believes leads to
higher quality by improving examiners' broad knowledge of the prior
art.120 In the United States, on the other hand, the study notes:
[The] applicant is legally bound to disclose any prior art
known to be material to patentability, which creates two po-
tential biases. First is the possibility of overloading the refer-
ence section, so that the examiner might not be able to easily
identify the most appropriate piece of prior art against which
the novelty and inventiveness conditions should be checked.
Second, some key technical references might not be listed by
the applicant and, therefore, must be found by the examiner
in its own investigation of the available prior art.121
If the duty of disclosure is not only failing to achieve its objective
of providing more comprehensive patent examination, but also is con-
tributing to poorer quality, as the study suggests, the PTO might do
well to look at how disclosure is handled in other patent offices.1 22
A. THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE
The European Patent Office ("EPO") is a regional patent office
governed by the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (or Eu-
ropean Patent Convention-"EPC").123 The office provides a uniform
application procedure that leads to the grant of a European patent,
which, once registered in any of the thirty-seven Contracting and
three Extension States, has the effect of a regular national patent in
118. Id. at 35. Other reasons included high turnover of examiners, heavy workload
per examiner, lack of an opposition process, low fees, and fewest restrictions on patenta-
ble subject matter.
119. Id. at 19.
120. Id. at 19-20. The study points out that in Japan, "a comprehensive list of prior
art must [also] legally be submitted by the applicant." Id. at 19. However, non-compli-
ance with the requirement cannot invalidate the patent or provide grounds for opposi-
tion (see infra notes 140-144 and accompanying text).
121. Id.
122. For another look at country-specific disclosure requirements, see Gina M. Bick-
nell, Note, To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Duty of Candor Obligations of the United
States and Foreign Patent Offices, 83 CHI.-KNT L. REV. 425, 458-63 (2008).
123. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention)
of 5 October 1973, EuRoPEAN PATENT OFFICE, available at http://www.epo.org/patents/
law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/mal.html (last consulted Sept. 27, 2010) (revised by the
Act revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991, and the Act revising the EPC of 29
November 2000).
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each country in which it is registered.124 In 2009, the EPO received
134,542 applications, about half of which originated from applicants
in the EPC member countries, and about twenty-five percent of which
came from applicants in the United States.1 25 In the same year, the
EPO granted 51,969 patents; of those, United States and German ap-
plicants each received about twenty-two percent, and Japanese appli-
cants seventeen percent.126 The EPO employs more than 4,100
examiners in offices in Munich (the principal headquarters), The
Hague, and Berlin.127
As mentioned above, there is no duty of disclosure in the EPO.128
Responsibility for examination rests exclusively with examiners, who
begin the examination process by preparing what is referred to as an
"extended European search report," namely, a search report of the
prior art accompanied by an initial opinion as to whether the claimed
invention meets the requirements of the EPC.12 9 Patent applications
and the results of the prior art search (but not the initial opinion,
which at this stage of the procedure is for the applicants' benefit only)
are generally published eighteen months following the date of filing,
or if priority of an earlier application was claimed, the priority filing
date. Following publication, applicants have a period of six months to
124. The EPO Member States are: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzer-
land, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France,
the United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, and Liechten-
stein. The three Extension States (countries that recognize the grant of European pat-
ents upon request and that are likely to join the EPO in the future) are: Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia.
125. See European patent applications filed in 2009 per technical field and origin,
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/about-us/office/statistics/applications.
html (last consulted Sept. 27, 2010).
126. See European patents granted: country of residence of the first named applicant,
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsfl0/3348
42B832FA62B7C125755BO05E1702/$File/patents_granted_2000-2009-per-residence_
en.pdf (last consulted Sept. 27, 2010); Patents granted in 2009 per technical field and
origin, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/about-us/office/statistics/patents-
technology.html (last consulted Sept. 27, 2010).
127. See Analysis of staff on post on 31 December 2009 by place of employment and
grade, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, httpJ/documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/
O/EF4D634D22819B28C125770CO05AB139/$File/staff analysis-place-ofemployment
2009.pdf (last consulted Sept. 27, 2010).
128. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE,
Part VII, Ch. I, Art. 114(1), http-/www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epe/2000/e/
ar114.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2010) ("In proceedings before it, the European Patent
Office shall examine the facts of its own motion; it shall not be restricted in this exami-
nation to the facts, evidence and arguments provided by the parties and the relief
sought.").
129. See Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Pat-
ents, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Chapter II, Rules 61-62, http//www.epo.org/patents/
law/legal-texts/html/ep/2000/e/ma2.html (last consulted Sept. 27, 2010).
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decide whether they wish to pursue their applications; if so, they re-
quest substantive examination.130
Although not required to do so, applicants may submit informa-
tion on prior art to examiners, and examiners are authorized to "invite
the applicant to provide, within a period to be specified, information
on prior art taken into consideration in the examination of national or
regional patent applications and concerning an invention to which the
European patent application relates."13 In practice, examiners do
not often issue such invitations, but if one does and an applicant fails
to respond in a timely manner, the application is deemed to be
withdrawn. 132
Similarly, once an application is published, third parties are per-
mitted to submit observations concerning the invention's patentabil-
ity.13 3 The observations usually consist of prior art references or
statements of prior use and must include the grounds on which they
are based.134 Examiners are required to take third-party observa-
tions into consideration, but only after applicants have had an oppor-
tunity to comment on them.135
Applicants and third parties are thus permitted to participate in
the EPO examination process, and applicants may sometimes be "in-
vited" to do so, but examination is considered the responsibility of ex-
130. How to apply for a European patent, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.
epo.org/patents/One-Stop-Page.html (last consulted Sept. 27, 2010).
131. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Part
VII, Ch. 1, Art. 124(1), http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/htm/epcd2000/e/
ar124.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2010); Implementing Regulations to the Convention on
the Grant of European Patents, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Ch. VII, Rule 141, http://
www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/rl41.html (last visited Sept. 27,
2010). See also Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, EUROPEAN
PATENT OFFICE, Part C, Ch. VI, § 2.3.1, http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/
eponet.nsfl0/7ffc755ad943703dcl2576f0054cacc/$FILE/guidelines_2010 partC_en.
pdf (last consulted Sept. 27, 2010).
132. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Part
VII, Ch. 1, Art. 124(2), httpJ/www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/htmlepc/2000/e/
arl24.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2010) (deeming applications withdrawn is a typical
remedy when applicants fail to respond to examiner actions).
133. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Part
VII, Ch. I, Art. 115, http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/
ar115.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2010); Implementing Regulations to the Convention on
the Grant of European Patents, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Part VII, Ch. II, Rule 114,
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epd2000/e/r114.html (last visited Sept.
27, 2010); Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, EUROPEAN PATENT
OFFICE, Part E, Ch. VI, § 3, http-//documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsfl0/7ffc
755ad943703dc12576f00054cace/$FLE/guidelines_2010 partE en.pdf (last visited
Sept. 27, 2010).
134. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, EUROPEAN PATENT
OFFICE, Part E, Ch. VI, § 3, http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsfl0/7ffc
755ad943703dcl2576f00054cacc/$FILE/guidelines_2010_partE en.pdf (last visited
Sept. 27, 2010).
135. Id.
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aminers, and examiners most often carry out the task without
applicants' help.
B. THE JAPAN PATENT OFFICE
The Japan Patent Office ("JPO") received 348,596 patent applica-
tions in 2009 and issued 193,349 patents.'36 It is the second largest
patent office in the world, behind only the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO"), in terms of the number of applications re-
ceived.137 Approximately 15.6% of all those applications were filed by
non-Japanese residents.' 38
Article 36(4)(ii) of the Japan Patent Act 39 requires applicants to
include in the portion of the application that contains a detailed
description of the invention a list of the prior art that they are aware
of at the time of filing. 1 4 0 Once the requirement is fulfilled, applicants
have no ongoing duty to submit prior art during examination. If, how-
ever, examiners recognize that applicants have not satisfied the re-
quirements of Article 36(4)(ii), they may, in accordance with Article
48-7,141 notify the applicants and give them an opportunity to comply.
Continued failure to provide the list of prior art constitutes grounds
136. The Number of Applications and Registrations Available in 2009, JAPAN PAT-
ENT OFFICE, POLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH DIVISION, GENERAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT,
http://www.jpo.go.jp/cgi/linke.cgi?url=/Torikumi_e/hiroba_ele_2009tourokukensuu.htm
(last consulted Sept. 28, 2010).
137. World Intellectual Property Indicators 2010, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION, 37 (2010), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/
patents/pdfl941_2010.pdf (last consulted Sept. 28, 2010).
138. Id. at 40.
139. [Patent Act], Act No. 121 of 1959 (Japan), available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/
seisaku/houreildata/PA.pdf (last consulted Sept. 27, 2010).
140. Article 36(4)(ii) provides as follows:
Article 36 (Patent applications)
(4) The statement of the detailed explanation of the invention ... shall comply
with each of the following items:
(ii) where the person requesting the grant of a patent has knowledge of any
invention(s) (inventions as provided in Article 29(1)(iii), hereinafter the same
shall apply in this item) related to the said invention, that has been known to
the public through publication at the time of filing of the patent application,
the statement shall provide the source of the information concerning the inven-
tion(s) known to the public through publication such as the name of the publi-
cation and others.
Id.
141. [Patent Act], Act No. 121 of 1959, Ch. 3, Article 48-7 (Japan), available at http:/
/www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/PA.pdf.
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for the examiner to refuse the application.142 It does not, however,
provide grounds for invalidation of the patent or for opposition.143
The Examination Guidelines for Patents and Utility Models in Ja-
pan ("Guidelines") provide guidance not only on details of compliance,
but also on the purpose of the disclosure requirement and the method
by which it should be enforced.144 The Guidelines clarify that the ob-
jective of disclosure is to contribute to "timely examination" and to
help the examiner grasp the "technical significance" and "technical
contribution" of the invention "in light of the state of the art at the
time of the filing of the application."145 In view of that objective, the
Guidelines indicate that violation of the disclosure requirement
neither constitutes a "substantial deficiency in the invention" nor does
it "damage the interest of a third person remarkably when it is
patented."146
The Guidelines accordingly instruct examiners not to routinely is-
sue notices of non-compliance under Article 48-7, but to do so only
when necessary.147 In particular, the Guidelines advise that a notice
should not be issued when no other reasons for rejection of the appli-
cation exist, since doing so "may be contrary to the aim of this system
whose main purpose [is the] realization of timely examination." 48
They also advise restraint when the applicants are individuals or
small- or medium-sized enterprises since such applicants may not be
privy to information on the state of the art; therefore, requiring com-
pliance "would not contribute to the timely examination" and would
also place applicants under an "excessive burden."149
While the JPO requires disclosure and motivates compliance by
holding out the threat of refusal to grant a patent, the office attempts
to balance the benefits that examiners derive from disclosure with the
burden that compliance places on applicants, and it puts no penalty on
non-compliance once a patent has validly been issued.
142. [Patent Act], Act No. 121 of 1959, Ch. 3, Article 49(v) (Japan), available at
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/houreildata/PA.pdf.
143. [Patent Act], Act No. 121 of 1959, Ch. 6, Article 123(1)(iv)(Japan), available at
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/PA.pdf.
144. Examination Guidelines for Patent and Utility Model (sic) in Japan, JAPAN PAT-
ENT OFFICE, EXAMINATION STANDARDS OFFICE (2010), http://www.jpo.go.jp/cgi/linke.cgi?
url=/Tetuzuki-e/t tokkyo e/1312-002_e.htm (last consulted Sept. 27, 2010). The guide-
lines on information disclosure are contained in Chapter 3, Requirements for Disclosure
of Information on Prior Art Document (sic).
145. Id. at Ch. 3, § 2(1).
146. Id.
147. Id. at § 2(2).
148. Id.
149. Id.
351
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
C. THE AUSTRALIAN PATENT OFFICE
The Australian Patent Office ("IP Australia") is a mid-sized pat-
ent office. It is the tenth largest office worldwide in terms of applica-
tions received-26,346 in 2008150 -and patents granted-11,863 in
2008.151 Non-residents of Australia accounted for 89.3% of all the ap-
plications filed in 2008,152 and they received 92.2% of all the patents
granted.' 53
Australian patent law is governed by the Patents Act of 1990, as
amended' 54 and the Patents Regulations 1991.155 On April 1, 2002,
amendments came into effect that created a very strict duty of disclo-
sure.156 The amended law and regulations required applicants to in-
form IP Australia "of the results of any documentary search conducted
by or on behalf of the applicant anywhere, for the purpose of assessing
the patentability of an invention, prior to the grant of a patent." 57 In
other words, an applicant was under a duty to disclose all prior art
searches carried out by or on behalf of foreign patent offices for any
application that corresponded to an application filed in Australia. The
penalty for failure to comply was removal of the patentee's ability to
amend a granted patent to avoid a novelty- or obviousness-type objec-
tion based on prior art of the sort that should have been disclosed.' 58
On October 22, 2007, Australia prospectively15 9 abolished the disclo-
sure requirement. 60
150. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, supra note 137, at 40.
151. Id. at 42.
152. Id. at 40.
153. Id. at 42.
154. Patents Act 1990 (Cth) Act No. 83 of 1990 as amended (Austl.), available at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl.nsfl0/915E47E19546
98DBCA257781000A2841/$file/Patentsl990WD02HYP.pdf (last consulted Sept. 27,
2010).
155. Patents Regulations 199 (Cth) Statutory Rules 1991 No.71 as amended, made
under the Patents Act 1990 (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/
Legislation/LegislativeInstrumentCompilationl.nsf/0/60926976425425CCCA25777400
0638D1/$file/Patentsl99lVoll.pdf (last consulted Sept. 27, 2010).
156. The amendments concern H§ 45(3) and 101D of the Act and Regulation 3.17 of
the Regulations.
157. Noel Brett, Australian Patent Law Changes: 1 April 2002, NEWSLETTER 50:
FICPI INFORMATION (June 2002), http:www.ficpi.org/newsletters/50/AUreform.html
(last consulted Aug.16, 2010).
158. Id.
159. The duty remains in force for applications that were subject to the disclosure
requirement prior to October 22, 2007.
160. Patents Regulations 199 (Cth) Statutory Rules 1991 No.71 as amended, made
under the Patents Act 1990, at Regulation 3.17B(2) (Austl.), available at httpJ/www.
comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/LegislativelnstrumentCompilation.nsfl0/609 269
76425425CCCA257774000638D1/$file/Patentsl99lVoll.pdf (last consulted Sept. 27,
2010).
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The principal reason for the abolition of the requirement was that
"[d]evelopments in the availability of foreign patent office search and
examination results over the Internet" made the disclosure require-
ment unnecessary.161 IP Australia recognized that major patent of-
fices, including the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO"), Japan Patent Office ("JPO"), and European Patent Office
("EPO"), had made their search and examination results available on-
line; that International Search Reports and International Preliminary
Reports on Patentability established under the Patent Cooperation
Treaty were also available; and that an increasing number of offices,
IP Australia included, were planning on joining the trend of making
their prior art electronically available. 162 According to IP Australia,
the patent office staff had already been accessing and using the online
databases.163 As a result:
Patent Office experience has been that much of the most rele-
vant material that is filed under the search result disclosure
provisions is already available over the Internet. It is also
frequently the case that search and examination results can
become available over the Internet before the applicant or
patentee has informed the Patent Office of their existence. 164
Eliminating the disclosure requirement allowed the examiners to
focus their efforts on accessing relevant foreign patent office search
and examination results over the Internet, and it freed them to be able
to continue to access prior art throughout the examination process as
necessary. Moreover, since "most jurisdictions have significantly less
onerous, or no, search result disclosure obligations,"1 65 abolishing the
requirement "ease [d] a burden that applicants in Australia face [d]."166
D. THE ISRAELI PATENT OFFICE
For a small country with a population of just about 7,600,000,
Israel has a very active patent office.167 The office received 7,742 ap-
plications in 2008, with about 19.7% of the applications coming from
Israeli residents, and it granted 1,855 patents, about 17.2% of which
161. Consultation Paper: Removal of the obligation to lodge search results under
subsection 45(3) and section 101D of Patents Act 1990, AUSTRAIIAN GOVERNMENT, IP
AUSTRALIA, 2 (May 2007), http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/news/Consultation%20Pa-
per%20-%20s%2045%283%29%20changes.pdf.
162. Id. at 3.
163. Id.
164. Id. (emphasis in original).
165. Id. at 5.
166. Id.
167. Latest Population Figures for Israel, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY (2010), http://
www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society-&_Culture/newpop.html (last consulted
Sept. 27, 2010).
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went to Israeli residents. The office recently moved to new, modern
headquarters, increased its examination staff, and achieved the status
of International Searching Authority under the Patent Cooperation
Treaty.168 The operations of the office are governed by the Patents
Law 5727-1967;169 in addition, the Commissioner of Patents issues
Circulars, which tend to function as patent rules.170
The Patents Law imposes a duty of disclosure with serious conse-
quences for non-compliance and, in that respect, is not dissimilar from
the United States' duty of candor. Section 18 of the law permits exam-
iners to require applicants to submit detailed prior art during the en-
tire prosecution process171 "until the application is accepted."172
Among the prior art documents that applicants may be required to
provide are the following:
(1) the list of documents used by patent authorities in any
foreign state in the examination of a patent application on
the same patent application, submitted in a foreign country
by the applicant or by his predecessor in title to the invention;
(2) a list of documents published before the application date,
known to the applicant and directly connected with the
invention;
(3) copies of publications and documents, a list of which the
applicant must submit under this Article, if the examiner so
demands;
(4) copies of publications and documents mentioned in publi-
cations and documents, a list of which the applicant must
submit under this Article, if the examiner so demands[.173
If an applicant fails to observe the broad disclosure requirements,
submits misleading information, or "knowingly [does] not keep the Of-
fice informed of a substantive change in the list of publications and
documents,"174 the penalties are severe. They permit the District
Court of Jerusalem, which is the designated court in most patent mat-
ters, or the Registrar, who is the head of the Patent Office, to revoke a
granted patent or refuse a patent application, order the grant of a
168. Appointment of the Israel Patent Office as an International Searching and Pre-
liminary Examining Authority under the PCT, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANI-
ZATION (Aug. 15, 2009), www.wipo.intledoes/mdocs/govbody/en/pct-a_40/pct a_40 5.doc.
169. Patents Law, 5727-1967, 21 LSI 76 (1976) (Isr.), available at http://
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file-id=1 2 8038 (last consulted Sept. 28, 2010).
170. See, e.g., IP News, Israeli Patent Commissoner Circulars, APPELFELD ZER
FISHER AND WEILER, http://www.patentim.com/eng/Israeli-Patent-Office-Circulars.asp
(last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
171. Patents Law, 5727-1967, 21 LSI 76 Section 18(1) (1976) (Isr.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file-id=128038 (last consulted Sept. 28, 2010).
172. Id. at Section 18A.
173. Id. at Section 18(a)(1)-(4).
174. Id. at Section 18C.
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compulsory license to exploit the patented invention to a third party,
or shorten the term of the patent grant.1 7 5 In addition, the District
Court may impose a fine under Israeli penal law on any person who
furnished misleading information or knowingly failed to provide up-
dated information to the office. 176
Two recent circulars issued by the Israeli Commissioner of Pat-
ents focus directly on the duty of disclosure. In Circular M. N. 77, the
Commissioner arguably expanded the duty by determining that, in ad-
dition to filing details of citations in corresponding applications filed
outside Israel, applicants are now required to submit copies of all the
responses they file to office actions or patent office opinions concern-
ing novelty and inventive step, including amendments to claims.1 77
The second circular, M. N. 70,178 provides a hint at the motivation
behind Israel's rigorous duty of disclosure procedures, which are in-
tended to increase examination productivity, minimize duplication of
resources, and shorten the examination process. 179 According to Cir-
cular M. N. 70, if an applicant has received a notice of allowance for an
identical application from one of a group of patent offices recognized
by the Commissioner, including the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office ("PTO"), the Israeli Office will grant a patent in Israel,
provided the applicant meets certain formalities.1 8 0 It can be argued
that a disclosure requirement makes sense in such circumstances
since both the office and the applicant receive direct benefits
therefrom.
It is interesting to note, however, that patent pendency-that is,
the length of time it takes to complete the patent examination pro-
cess-does not appear to be any faster in Israel than in other compa-
rable offices with less demanding duty of disclosure rules.1 8 '
175. Id. at Section 18C(l)(a)-(c).
176. Id. at Section 18C(2).
177. Michael Factor, Israel Patent Office Issues Draconian Duty of Disclosure Direc-
tive, THE IP FACTOR (Jan. 17, 2010), http://blog.ipfactor.co.il/2010/01/17/israel-patent-
office-requires-details-of-prosecution-of-all-corresponding-patents-and-applications-
abroad/ (The circular took effect on June 30, 2010).
178. See IP News, Israel Patents - Israel Patent Commissioner Circular M.N. 70
Examining patent applications with corresponding applications which were allowed, AP-
PELFELD ZER FISHER AND WEILER (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.patentim.comleng/Israel-
Patent-Office-Circular-Inside.asp?Article=668.
179. Factor, supra note 177.
180. APPELFELD, supra note 178.
181. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, supra note 137, at 71 (In 2008
Israel had 38,423 pending applications. Canada on the other hand had 186,989.).
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E. OTHER OFFICES
As shown above, duty of disclosure requirements vary from coun-
try to country, although none match that of the United States. Gener-
ally, disclosure requirements can be grouped into three broad
categories. The first is patent offices that require no disclosure of
prior art. The Korean Intellectual Property Office ("KIPO"), in addi-
tion to the European Patent Office ("EPO") and Australia, is another
example of an office that examines without requiring disclosure from
applicants. 182 KIPO was also among the first patent offices in the
world to automate and to rely on electronic databases for prior art
searching. 183
The second category, perhaps the largest, are offices that impose
no general duty of disclosure, but authorize examiners to request prior
art from applicants, in particular, prior art cited in corresponding ap-
plications filed in other countries. The Canadian Intellectual Prop-
erty Office and Mexican Institute of Industrial Property are examples
of this category, but the prior art that their examiners may request
differs. In Canada, examiners may require applicants to disclose prior
art cited against corresponding European and United States applica-
tions. Applicants are free and, in fact encouraged by the office, to sub-
mit the prior art on their own. 184 In Mexico, examiners may require
applicants to submit prior art cited by any International Searching
Authority under the Patent Cooperation Treaty.185 Neither country
requests applicants to furnish domestic prior art. Although beyond
the scope of this Article, it would be instructive to determine the fre-
quency with which examiners still request prior art from applicants
since the information they may be interested in receiving is now all
freely available on the Internet.
The third category consists of those offices, like the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") and the Israeli Office, that re-
quire disclosure as part of the examination process. The Indian Pat-
182. AIPLA International Patent Law Handbook, South Korea, AMERICAN INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW AssoCIATION, http://www2.aipla.org/html/patent-handbook/coun-
tries/south-korea/SKgeneral.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
183. Overview: "KIPOnet," KOREAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, http://www.
kipo.go.kr/kpo/user.tdf?a=user.english.htmlHtmlApp&c=90100&catmenu=ek
9OlOO
(last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
184. See Manual of Patent Office Practice, CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF-
FICE, Ch. 13, Section 13.04 (Oct. 2010), http://www.ic.ge.caleic/site/cipointernet-in-
ternetopic.nsflenglh wr00720.html; see also AIPLA International Patent Law
Handbook, Canada, AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AsSOCIATION, http://www2.
aipla.org/html/patent-handbook/countries/canada/CAgeneral.htmI (last consulted Sept.
27, 2010).
185. AIPLA International Patent Law Handbook, Mexico, AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAw AssocIATION, http://www2.aipla.org/html/patent-handbook/countries/
mexicolMXgeneral.html (last consulted Sept. 27, 2010).
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ent Office is another example.186 Applicants for Indian patents have
an obligation that continues until grant of the Indian patent to inform
examiners about corresponding applications in foreign countries and
to submit search results from foreign patent offices.' 87 Applicants
may also be required to furnish details about the processing of appli-
cations outside India, including novelty objections raised by other pat-
ent offices and amendments made to the specification or claims in any
counterpart applications.18 8 Violations of the disclosure provisions
can result in the revocation of a patent.' 89 Thus, while disclosure is a
requirement in India, it applies only to foreign prior art information.
Although the United States is not alone in imposing a duty of dis-
closure on applicants and penalizing those who fail to respect it, the
United States' duty is arguably the most pervasive and the penalty
among the most severe. As Judge Rader has pointed out, "the United
States remains the only country in the world that embraces inequita-
ble conduct as an incentive to disclose prior art."' 90 Given changing
technology, increasing availability of patent information, evolving le-
gal landscape, and growing international cooperation, the question
must therefore be asked, does the duty of candor still make sense?
Should we continue to maintain a disclosure policy akin to that of
Israel, or should we follow Australia's lead and rethink the wisdom,
scope, and limits of the duty of candor?
IV. DO TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION MAKE DISCLOSURE REDUNDANT?
A. CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY
The world of patent examination in 1977, when Rule 56 was
adopted, was a very different world from that of patent examination
today. The duty of candor "was established in an era of paper infor-
mation stored in file cabinets and on bookshelves."1 91 In contrast:
186. See Bicknell, supra note 122, at 461.
187. Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, § 8, INDIA CODE (1970), amended by Patents
(Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 6, INDIA CODE (2005) (The Patents Act, 1970, is
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file-id=128092. The Patents
(Amendment) Act, 2005, is available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/textjsp?fileid=
128116).
188. The Patents Act, No. 39 1970, § 8(2), INDIA CODE (1970), amended by Patents
(Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 6(b) NDIA CODE (2005).
189. Id. at § 64(m).
190. Rader, supra note 52, at 781.
191. Brief for Patterson Thuente Christensen Pedersen, P.A., as Amicus Curiae, at
2, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 593 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Nos.
2008-1511, 2008-1512, 2008-1513, 2008-1514, 2008-1595) (on file with author) [herein-
after Amicus Brief].
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Plainly, the advent of the internet and computer technology
has made a mountain of information readily accessible to al-
most everyone with access to a computer and the Internet.
While it may have taken days or weeks of intensive library
research to uncover a particular patent or article in the
1970's, today the very same article might be accessed in just a
few keystrokes with the right search engines and a judicious
choice of key word search terms.192
The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") is highly
automated, as are many patent offices worldwide. Patent applicants
increasingly file their applications electronically.19 3 Examiners have
access to a host of databases that connect them to the world's body of
patent documentation and technical literature. 194 Examiners create
and execute their prior art search strategies online, and they depend
upon key-word search engines and text-searchable databases to per-
form their work efficiently.' 95 Yet examiners must work from
scanned information disclosure statements ("IDS"), the form appli-
cants are instructed to use to comply with the duty of candor, which
appear as image documents and are not text searchable.196 In the
high-tech context in which examiners work, the disclosure of prior art
through IDS filings may thus have become counterproductive. Since
examiners already have electronic access to virtually all the prior art
information applicants disclose, obliging them to review the entries on
an IDS form is less likely to contribute to examination quality than it
is to constitute a burden on examiner workflow.197
192. Id. at 14.
193. About EFS-Web, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://
www.uspto.gov/patents/process/file/efs/index.jsp (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
194. See, for example, MPEP, §§ 904-905, and European Patent Office, Guidelines
for Examination in the EPO, Part B, Ch. IX.
195. Amicus Brief, supra note 191, at 17.
196. Id.
197. This analysis lends support to the argument by Cotropia, Lemley, and Sampat
that examiners may tend to ignore applicant-supplied prior art for lack of time. Accord-
ing to the Amicus Brief, supra note 191, at 18-19, "Thus, while the materials may be
'made of record' in a prosecution history file when an Examiner checks off the tens or
hundreds of filings on an IDS form, the reality is that these materials cannot be practi-
cally reviewed in the current key word based search system and, accordingly, are left
essentially untouched once they are filed and their titles are checked off on the IDS
form." Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Do Applicant
Patent Citations Matter? Implications for the Presumption of Validity (Stanford Law
and Economics Olin, Working Paper No. 401, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1656568.
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B. CHANGES IN THE LAW
The world of examination has changed in other ways as well. In
1977, patent examination and prosecution took place entirely in se-
cret. As Robert Armitage has stated:
(In 1977], patent examination . . . consisted of dialogue be-
tween the patent examiner and the patent applicant inacces-
sible to the public until after the patent issued. The public
was wholly barred from participation in the patent examina-
tion process.
Once a patent issued, there was no redress back in the
Office if important information was not considered by the pat-
ent examiner or was misrepresented to the examiner by the
applicant for patent. In addition, much of the information
that was potentially important to whether a patent was valid
or not was not publicly accessible knowledge, but information
known only to the patent applicant.'9 8
The duty of candor was deemed necessary because there were very few
other effective ways to ensure that applicants obeyed the rules.
Today, two, and potentially three, changes have taken place that
minimize the need for concern. The first is the publication of pending
applications. Prior to the adoption of the American Inventors Protec-
tion Act of 1999,L99 all pending patent applications were kept secret
and were not made public unless and until they issued as patents.
The competitors of patent applicants often had no notice of pending
applications until they were charged with patent infringement. Since
the adoption of the Act, however, the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office ("PTO") has engaged in 18-month publication, 200 a prac-
tice followed by patent offices throughout the world. Under the
system, pending applications are published on-line on the PTO web-
site201 roughly eighteen months following their filing date and are ac-
198. Robert A. Armitage, The Legislative Agenda for the 111th Congress: Inequita-
ble Conduct and Post-Grant Review: Why the Imperative to Eliminate the 'Inequitable
Conduct' Defense? What Relates Eliminating the Defense to Expanding Post-Grant Re-
view?, Am. INTELL. PROP. L. AsS'N, 5 (2009), available at http://www.aipla.org/html/mw/
2009/papers/Armitage-paper.pdf (paper presented at 2009 Mid-Winter Institute of the
American Intellectual Property Law Association).
199. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501
(1999).
200. Id. at §§ 4501-02. The provisions on publication of pending applications are
codified in 35 U.S.C. § 122(b).
201. Search for Patents, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://
www.uspto.gov/patents/process/search/index.jsp (last consulted Sept. 27, 2010). In Au-
gust 2004, the PTO inaugurated a system known as Public PAIR (public application and
information retrieval). Under the system, "anyone with Internet access anywhere in
the world can use PTO's Web site (www.uspto.gov) to track the status of a public patent
application as it moves from publication to final disposition, and review documents in
the official application file, including all decisions made by patent examiners and their
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cessible to all.2 02 Competitors can now be aware of and track in detail
applicant prosecution behavior.
The second change concerns the adoption of inter partes reexami-
nation, which was also a product of the American Inventors Protection
Act.203 Inter partes reexamination is an administrative proceeding
that permits third parties to challenge the grant of patents on grounds
that a "substantial new question of patentability" exists that the PTO
did not consider during examination. 204 If the PTO decides that a
substantial new question does exist, it will issue an order for reexami-
nation, 205 which is carried out basically along the lines of the original
examination. 206 The purpose of inter partes reexamination is to pro-
vide a lower-cost alternative to litigation to resolve questions of valid-
ity.207 While inter partes reexamination is not a panacea, it succeeds
in giving third parties a remedy in the event the PTO failed to con-
sider all relevant prior art.208
The third-possible-change concerns the introduction of a "post-
grant review" system somewhat similar to post-grant opposition sys-
tems that exist under the European Patent Convention 209 and in na-
tional patent systems. 210 Senate bill S. 515,211 the latest iteration in
a line of patent reform efforts dating back to 2005,212 attempted to
give third parties a nine-month window of opportunity to challenge
reasons for making them." See Internet Access to Patent Application Files Now Availa-
ble, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Aug. 2, 2004), http://
www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2004104-13.jsp.
202. There are two exceptions to 18-month publication: applications will not be pub-
lished if they are either provisional patent applications or applications concerning
which the applicant has certified that she will not file any other applications on the
same invention in other countries.
203. American Inventors Protection Act, 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006). The statutory pro-
visions governing inter partes reexamination are at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-18 (2006).
204. 35 U.S.C. §§ 303-04 (2006).
205. 35 U.S.C. § 313.
206. 35 U.S.C. § 314.
207. See generally Matthew A. Smith, Inter Partes Reexamination (Jan. 31, 2009),
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl-s3lPublications/FileUploadl37/5663/Inter PartesReex-
amination.pdf (last consulted Sept. 27, 2010).
208. Its principal weakness is that inter partes reexamination requesters are subject
to estoppels; they may not raise the same validity issues in any subsequent litigation
that they raised during reexamination.
209. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Arts.
99-105, httpJ/www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/apv.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 27, 2010).
210. In Australia, for example, opposition can be lodged up to an extendable period
of three months from publication of acceptance of the application.
211. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009).
212. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005); Patent Reform
Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th
Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009).
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the validity of any one or more claims of a granted patent.213 The
post-grant review proceeding would have taken the form of an admin-
istrative hearing conducted by a Patent Trial and Appeal Board,
whose decisions would be subject to appeal. 214 Post-grant review was
not intended to replace inter partes reexamination, but would likely
have required the provisions on inter partes reexamination to be
amended. 215
Supporters of the doctrine of inequitable conduct often turn to the
lack of post-grant opposition in the United States as justification for
maintaining a broad duty of candor with severe repercussions for fail-
ure to comply.216 Although the One Hundred Eleventh Session of
Congress failed to adopt S. 515, the One Hundred Twelfth Session
stands a good chance of enacting comparable legislation. If so, the
bill's provisions on post-grant review would vitiate many of the sup-
porters' concerns.
C. CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
One of the objectives of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office ("PTO") is to "improve patent pendency and quality by increas-
ing international cooperation and work sharing."2 17 The PTO de-
scribes its work sharing efforts, which are designed to address the
problem of duplication of work among patent offices, as follows:
In view of this growing duplication of work and the impact it
is having on processing times and backlogs, the USPTO is im-
plementing several international initiatives aimed at manag-
ing its workload. The USPTO has identified work sharing as
a key priority. Work sharing is a cooperative approach to
workload management under which one country's office le-
verages the search and examination work previously com-
pleted by another country's office on a corresponding
application to the maximum extent possible. 218
Together with its principal partner offices, the European Patent
Office ("EPO"), Japan Patent Office ("JPO"), Korean Intellectual Prop-
erty Office ("KIPO"), and the Chinese State Intellectual Property Of-
fice ("SIPO"), the PTO has already made great strides in coordinating
examination and sharing search and examination information. The
five offices together accounted for 76.2% of all patent applications filed
213. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 5(d).
214. Id.
215. See id. § 5(a).
216. See MUELLER, supra note 6, at 432.
217. See 2010-2015 Strategic Plan, 14-20 (2010), UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADE-
MARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/index.jsp#heading-1 (last consulted
Sept. 28, 2010).
218. Id. at 14.
361
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
in 2008.219 As a result, there is little need for applicants indiscrimi-
nately to blanket the PTO with prior art information, particularly
when the office is likely to base its examination on search and exami-
nation results from targeted offices.
Four work sharing initiatives are of particular note: the Patent
Prosecution Highway ("PPH"); Triway; the Foundation Projects of the
Five IP Offices ("IP5"); and a new initiative entitled SHARE (Strategic
Handling of Applications for Rapid Examination).
1. The Patent Prosecution Highway
The Patent Prosecution Highway ("PPH") provides for the fast-
track examination of applications. It has proven to be of great benefit
to both patent offices and applicants. Under the PPH, an applicant
who has corresponding applications pending in two offices, and who
receives notice that at least one claim in the application filed in the
first office has been allowed, may petition the second office to fast-
track the examination of the corresponding claims in the application
filed in the second office. 220 The initiative works because the second
office is able to depend on and benefit from the examination performed
by the first office. "By coordinating patentable results between both
nations' offices, applicants can expect to obtain patents in both nations
more quickly."221
The PPH began in May 2006 as a pilot initiative between the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") and Japanese
Patent Office ("JPO"). The initiative has proven so successful that the
PTO now has twenty agreements in place, 222 and many of its PPH
219. World Intellectual Property Indicators 2010, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION, 38 (2010), http://www.wipo.intlexport/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/
patents/pdf/941_2010.pdf (last consulted Sept. 28, 2010). According to the PTO, that
number is 90%. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 217, at 19.
It is worthy of note that the five offices meet regularly, share a common website, and
have adopted the name "IP5." See The Five IP Offices (IP5) and its vision, http://
www.fiveipoffices.org/about-us.html.
220. See Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) - Fast Tract Examination of Applica-
tions, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/
initLevents/pph/index.jsp (last visited Dec. 30, 2010)
221. Press Release, 09-28, USPTO, the European Patent Office and the Japan Patent
Office to Expand Patent Prosecution Highway Work Share Program, UNITED STATES
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2009/
092.jsp.
222. As of September 2010, the PTO had agreements with: Australia, Austria (na-
tional and Patent Cooperation Treaty (TCT")), Canada, Denmark, the EPO (regional
and PCT), Finland, Germany, Hungary, Japan (national and PCT), Korea (national and
PCT), Russia (national and PCT), Singapore, Spain (national and PCT), and the UK. Id.
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partners also have their own web of PPH agreements. 223 To partici-
pate in a PPH program between the PTO and another office, where
the PTO is the office of second filing, an applicant must file a request
and include a discrete list of information and documentation concern-
ing the results of the first office's examination, including relevant of-
fice actions, the documents cited in the actions, and a list of the claims
that were allowed. 224 The PTO then carries out an expedited exami-
nation based largely on the first office's results. Given the structure
and objectives of the PPH, it hardly seems necessary for an applicant
to have to submit any more information than what the PPH requires,
since the additional information would in all likelihood be ignored by
an examiner. One can even question why an applicant needs to sub-
mit any documentation at all since the documents are available to the
examiner online.225
2. Triway
The Triway is a work-sharing initiative among the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), European Patent Office
("EPO"), and Japanese Patent Office ("JPO"), intended to "leverage
the searching expertise" of each office.2 2 6 Under the Triway pilot, the
offices attempt to coordinate the timing of the searches they carry out
on corresponding applications and then share the results among
themselves in order to reduce their individual search and examination
burdens.227 Provided that systems such as Triway are able to suc-
ceed, offices will routinely exchange prior art information among
themselves. Applicants will therefore have no need to furnish it.
3. The Foundation Projects
Since October 2008, the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice ("PTO"), the European Patent Office ("EPO"), Japan Patent Office
("JPO"), Korean Intellectual Property Office ("KIPO"), and the Chi-
nese State Intellectual Property Office ("SIPO") (collectively "the IP5")
223. Patent Prosecution Highway Between USPTO and 1IPO, UNITED STATES PAT-
ENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init-events/pph/
pph kipojsp (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
224. See, e.g., Request for Participation in the Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH)
Pilot Program Between European Patent Office (EPO) and the USPTO, Doc Code:
PPH.PET.652, formPTO/SB/20EP (05-10), UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, www.uspto.gov/forms/sbOO20ep-Jill.pdf.
225. One exception to the availability of documentation is English translations of
non-English prior art, which applicants may thus need to furnish.
226. Triway Pilot Among USPTO, EPO, and JPO, UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/triwaypilot.html (last visited
Sept. 27, 2010).
227. Id.
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have been engaged in ten collaborative "Foundation Projects," the pur-
pose of which is to "harmonise the search and examination environ-
ment of each office and to standardize the information-sharing
process."228 One of the projects, referred to as a "One Portal Dossier,"
would, like the Triway pilot, provide common access to search and ex-
amination results. Once the project becomes operational, an examiner
in the PTO will be able to access, exchange, and make use of the prior
art information discovered by examiners in the other IP5 offices con-
cerning all corresponding applications.229 Other Foundation Projects
will result in the elaboration of common prior art search datasets,
search engines, and systems for sharing prior art search strategies,
the establishment of a common patent classification system to in-
crease search efficiency, improvements in machine translation to per-
mit easier access to foreign language prior art, and the adoption of
common examination practice rules.230 Although the Foundation
Projects are in their early stages, they are likely to result in a virtual
patent office where the work of any single examiner will be available
to all in a manner that minimizes redundancy, maximizes efficiency,
and obviates the need for additional sources of prior art.
4. Strategic Handling of Applications for Rapid Examination
(SHARE)
SHARE is another attempt to improve work sharing by coordinat-
ing the timing of examination among offices. The objective of SHARE,
which is a United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO")-
originated initiative, is to make sure that an office of second filing of
an application does not begin its examination work until the office of
first filing of the application has at least completed an initial search
and examination. "The reason [for the coordination] is straightfor-
ward-if the second office examination has already begun, it is diffi-
cult to reutilize the first office results after the fact."2 3 1
The PTO and Korean Intellectual Property Office ("KIPO") have
established a SHARE pilot that may serve as the basis for an ex-
panded program. 232 Under the terms of the pilot, if an application
were first filed in KIPO and a corresponding application were subse-
quently filed in the PTO, KIPO would accelerate work on the Korean
228. Ten Foundation Projects, FIVEIPOFFIcES, http://www.fiveipoffices.org/projects.
html (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
229. Common Access to Search and Examination Access ("One Portal Dossier"),
FIVEIPOFFICEs, http://www.fiveipoffices.org/projects/commonacc.html (last visited Sept.
27, 2010).
230. FIvEIPOFFICES, supra note 228.
231. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 217, at 16.
232. Id.
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application so that the results could be sent "in a timely fashion" to
the PTO, and the PTO would not begin its examination of the corre-
sponding United States application until it received the search and
examination results from KIPO.233 In such circumstances, it is ques-
tionable whether application of Rule 56 would contribute to the sound
functioning of SHARE or instead would inhibit it.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The PTO has arguably reached the point where the submission of
applicant-disclosed prior art is duplicative and unnecessary, but if it is
not yet fully there, it is moving speedily in that direction. As a result,
the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") and the pat-
ent community need to give serious consideration to the future of the
duty of candor. Maintaining the duty in its present form is untenable.
It does not contribute to examination quality; in fact, it may impede it.
Due to its unfortunate link to the defense of inequitable conduct, vio-
lations of the duty have perverse and irrational consequences: "The
most severe consequence of the successful assertion of the 'inequitable
conduct' defense falls on those patents that would have issued in ex-
actly the same form with exactly the same claims in the absence of
any misconduct."234
In the interests of sound patent policy, Rule 56 should be re-
scinded and replaced with a rule that makes sense in today's world of
patent examination. Short of abolishing the duty of candor altogether,
an alternative would be to follow the model of the European Patent
Office ("EPO"). Under such a system, no duty of disclosure would be
imposed on an applicant unless an examiner determined that informa-
tion was needed but the examiner was unable to access it herself.
Penalties would be imposed only if the applicant failed to respond to
the examiner's request. In that way, examiners would be free to struc-
ture and carry out their examinations without having to wade through
unwieldy information disclosure statements ("IDS") filings, and appli-
cants would be free from the costly, time-consuming, and worrisome
burden of assessing materiality and compiling prior art.2 3 5
Revamping Rule 56 would also resolve the dilemma over inequita-
ble conduct. With a narrow, examiner-initiated duty to disclose, the
doctrine of inequitable conduct would return to the purpose for which
it was originally intended: as a remedy in cases of fraud and affirma-
233. Id.
234. Armitage, supra note 43, at 1.
235. Freedom from IDS filings might have the added benefit of giving applicants the
motivation to carry out their own prior art searches, which might result in higher qual-
ity applications.
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tive misrepresentation. Litigation over the reasonableness of prior art
omissions would become a thing of the past.
The PTO's mission is:
Fostering innovation, competitiveness and economic growth,
domestically and abroad by delivering high quality and
timely examination of patent ... applications, guiding domes-
tic and international intellectual property policy, and deliver-
ing intellectual property information and education
worldwide, with a highly skilled, diverse workforce. 236
The duty of candor in its current iteration does nothing to foster the
PTO mission. Making rational sense of Rule 56, however, would not
only help the PTO achieve high quality and timely examination, it
would also serve as a beacon of responsive intellectual property policy-
making and would go far in improving examiner work life. It is time
for change.
236. 2010-2015 Strategic Plan, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFIcE, 4
(2010), http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/indexjsp#heading-1 (last consulted Sept.
28, 2010).
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